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Abstract
Decentralising the administration of 
communally-owned land to a local 
system in Botswana was a sound 
objective and could be pursued 
elsewhere in the region. Yet, despite 
Botswana having grappled relatively 
successfully with many of the land 
challenges, evidence suggests that 
tribal land administration is not free of 
problems. 
Introduction
Land reform in Botswana started with 
a commitment to enlarge the tribal 
lands and promote democratisation 
and decentralisation of decision 
making. Land reform was also aimed 
at increasing agricultural productivity, 
conserving range resources and 
improving social equity in rural areas.
In 1968, the Government enacted the 
Tribal Land Act, which transferred 
the chiefs’ powers over tribal land to 
land boards, statutory bodies whose 
members were mostly nominated 
by the Minister responsible for land 
matters. Decentralisation enabled the 
modernisation of rural land tenure 
and democratised (and made more 
accountable) rural land administration. 
The transfer of substantial tracts of 
communally-occupied state land to the 
land boards in succeeding years can be 
seen as part of the same process. 
The Tribal Land Act
The Tribal Land Act of 1968 transferred 
the chiefs’ powers over tribal land to 
land boards, statutory bodies whose 
members were mostly nominated by the 
Minister responsible for land matters. 
The Act vested ‘All the rights and title 
to land in each tribal area … in the land 
board … in trust for the benefit and 
advantage of the tribesmen of that 
area and for the purpose of promoting 
the economic and social development 
of all the peoples of Botswana.’ The 
Act introduced the principle of leases 
under common law for commercial uses 
of tribal land, e.g. trading stores and 
other businesses, fenced commercial 
ranches, etc., and also for grants to 
persons who were not tribesmen of the 
area.
The purpose of the change was 
stated at the time to be to enable the 
modernisation of rural land tenure 
and to democratise (and make more 
accountable) rural land administration. 
The transfer of substantial tracts of 
communally-occupied state land to the 
land boards in succeeding years can be 
seen as part of the same process. 
Tribal Land 
Administration
Prior to 1970 all tribal land in Botswana 
was administered by the chiefs in the 
traditional manner, following the 
norms and rules of customary law. 
At Independence in 1966, the new 
government adopted a policy of 
modernising and democratising local 
administration that involved reducing 
the powers of the chiefs by transferring 
their administrative duties to more 
democratic institutions. In pursuit of 
this policy, local government functions 
in the rural areas were transferred to 
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District Councils in 1967 under the Local 
Government (District Councils) Act of 
1966. These councils were made up of 
both elected and nominated members, 
with elected members forming a small 
majority. 
Customary law in 
Botswana
The great majority of land rights, 
whether held under individual or 
common property on tribal land, are 
held under customary law. Broadly 
speaking, under Tswana Customary 
Law, every tribesman is entitled to the 
grant of sufficient land for cultivation 
and housing to meet his household’s 
subsistence needs and has the right 
of access for livestock to graze on the 
communal grazing land. The tribesman 
also has the right of access to natural 
surface waters (including sub-surface 
flow in sand rivers) for household and 
livestock watering purposes and to 
develop artificial ground water sources 
(e.g. wells or boreholes) or surface 
water sources (e.g. dams and hafirs 
– special dams used for fresh flood 
water collection where no well-defined 
drainage channels or sites for small 
dams exist) for his own use. These rights 
are heritable, but are not otherwise 
freely exchangeable or transferable 
and may not be sold except with the 
consent of the land authority.
In practice, tribesmen have virtually 
open access to grazing and natural 
surface water sources (almost all of 
which are either seasonal or ephemeral). 
Since the exercise of rights to residential 
or arable land or to develop artificial 
water sources may impinge upon the 
rights of others, tribesmen wishing 
to exercise these rights must apply to 
the land authority. Prior to the Tribal 
Land Act coming into force in 1970, the 
role of land authority was filled by the 
chief; since 1970 the exercise of these 
rights has been regulated by the tribal 
land boards.
While access to natural water sources 
and communal land – and its grass, fuel 
wood and other natural resources – is 
effectively open, access to arable or 
residential land or to artificial water 
sources is not, but is controlled by the 
grantee, who has the right to exclude 
other people. Thus arable fields and 
residential compounds may be, and 
usually are, fenced. The Tribal Land Act 
did not change or amend customary 
land law in any way other than by 
transferring the role of land authority 
away from the chief to the land 
board, and by introducing certificates 
of customary grant as evidence of 
customary grants of individual rights 
for wells, borehole drilling, arable 
lands and individual plots. No fees 
are payable for the exercise of any 
customary right under the Tribal Land 
Act. While all grants made after 1970 
are validated by a certificate issued by 
the land board, no attempt has been 
made to register grants made by the 
chiefs prior to 1970. These were usually 
given verbally in the kgotla (chief’s 
court) and are mostly undocumented 
in any form. Since these rights are 
heritable, and a large number of the 
original grantees are still alive anyway, 
many people who have legitimate title 
to land have no documentary evidence 
to prove it. On the other hand, this 
situation can also be used by people to 
claim rights in excess of what they were 
granted.
Land Boards
A demand arose in those areas where 
significant populations resided on 
state land (where they had the status 
of tenants-at-will, without clearly 
Land tenure systems
By 1980, transfer of state land on a substantial scale and purchase of freehold land 
in congested areas had caused the proportion of tribal land to increase to 69%, 
while the proportion of freehold land had fallen back to 5.7% and state land to 
25%. Today, tribal land comprises about 71% of the national land area, freehold 
just over 4% and state land the remainder. Thus, land policy in Botswana has been 
to increase the proportion of land owned by the tribes at the expense of both state 
ownership and private ownership of freeholds. The changes are illustrated by Table 
1 below:
Table 1: Land tenure categories in Botswana
Year Tribal land State land Freehold land
Area (km2)     % Area (km2)     % Area (km2)     %
1966 278,535      48.8 270,761        47.5 21,356            3.7
1979 403,730      69.4 145,040       24.9 32,960           5.7
1998 411,349       70.9 144,588       24.9 24,572           4.2
2009 411,559       70.9 144,611        24.9 24,339           4.2
Tribal land may be occupied communally under customary law or under common 
law lease. Some tribal land is used and managed by the state as game reserves and 
forest reserves, with the consent of the land authority.  
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defined rights), for such areas to 
become tribal land where land would 
be administered by a land board. There 
were initially eight land boards that 
covered the eight tribal territories 
that had been recognised by the 
Protectorate Government. In addition, 
transfers of former state land have 
extended a number of the pre-existing 
tribal territories.
The land board is required to consult 
the district council on matters of 
policy and the President has power to 
give directions of a general or specific 
nature to the land board, which it must 
obey.
The Minister appoints the Board 
Secretary while the rest of the board’s 
staff were, for many years, appointed, 
promoted, disciplined and terminated 
by the Unified Local Government 
Service. Consequently, the boards 
themselves had no effective say in the 
composition and management of their 
own staff.
As is inevitable with such a radical 
change affecting the administration 
of so crucial a resource for the great 
majority of the country’s inhabitants, 
there were teething troubles, problems 
of acceptance by some sections of the 
population and severe shortages of 
funds, transport and competent, trained 
people to run the new institutions. 
However, in spite of the problems, the 
change was seen as a success overall, 
not only by the government but also by 
the bulk of the population. 
In order to address some of these 
problems, four new tribal areas 
were established, in the Tati, Chobe, 
Kgalagadi and Ghanzi tribal areas, 
each with its own land board, where 
large tracts of state land, occupied 
by a distinctive community, were 
‘tribalised’. As a result of the problems 
it perceived in the operation of the 
Act, the government has over the years 
introduced a number of amendments 
to the Act, with significant changes 
being implemented in 1984 and 1993. 
It was soon found that in the larger 
tribal territories the land boards 
could not handle the large number 
of applications received for customary 
rights for residential plots and 
ploughing fields, and initially the 
chiefs had to continue to perform this 
function. This was neither satisfactory 
nor popular, so subordinate land 
boards were established to perform 
this function from 1973 onwards. All 
the land boards, with the exception 
of those in Tlokweng, Tati and Chobe 
(which cover small areas with small 
populations), now have subordinate 
land boards to deal with customary 
allocations. By 2009 there were a 
total of 37 subordinate land boards in 
operation.
In 1984, further significant changes 
were made. The chief ceased to be a 
member of the land board, but instead 
had the right to nominate a member 
to represent him. This was due to 
conflict of interest as the chief, who 
retains significant judicial functions, 
might find himself adjudicating a 
dispute over a decision by the land 
board where he had participated as 
a member. The method of selection 
of most members also changed, with 
prospective members standing for 
election at the main kgotlas in the 
area, at which their supporters formed 
lines to indicate their support for the 
candidates. Following these elections, 
a Land Board Selection Committee, 
chaired by the District Commissioner, 
made recommendations to the Minister 
as to who should be appointed.
The changes introduced in 1993 were 
more radical. First of all, the concept 
of tribesmanship was abolished. In 
future, all citizens would be eligible to 
be allocated land in any tribal territory 
or area in Botswana. Prior to this date, 
the Minister’s consent was required for 
any grant to a person who was not a 
tribesman of the area. This proposal 
was introduced following pressure from 
the political elite, who wanted access 
to tribal land in the peri-urban areas 
around Gaborone and Francistown, 
which were booming. Due to land 
pressure, the land authorities in these 
areas were becoming more selective 
about who they allocated land to. The 
land pressure was largely a consequence 
of the government’s failure to service 
sufficient land in the urban areas and 
to enforce development covenants on 
the land they had serviced, leading to a 
housing shortage and excessively high 
rentals. This change has been rather 
unpopular, particularly amongst the 
former tribesmen of the peri-urban 
tribal areas, who saw their loss of right 
as not being compensated by the gain of 
rights of access in the more rural areas. 
The membership of the land boards 
was initially made up of: 
• two members of the District Coun-
cil, elected by the council from 
amongst its own members to rep-
resent it on the board;  
• the chief of the tribe whose land 
the board administered; 
• up to 12 members appointed by 
the Minister acting on the advice 
of the District Commissioner (the 
number of members varies from 
one board to another); and 
• two ex officio members to repre-
sent the Ministries of Agriculture 
and Commerce and Industry.
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It was also, and remains, unpopular 
amongst some elements in the rural 
communities, who saw their land rights 
as being threatened by pressure from 
the urban elite wanting farms and 
smallholdings in the communal areas 
where they derive their livelihood. 
Also in 1993, the method of selection 
of land board members was changed 
again. The positions for two members 
elected by the District Council and 
the member appointed by the chief 
were abolished. Prospective members 
are now subject to ‘elections’ in the 
kgotla, from a list of candidates 
approved by the Land Board Selection 
Committee, who subsequently make 
recommendations to the Minister as 
to who should be appointed. The Land 
Board Selection Committee comprises 
three officials, the chief and a member 
appointed by the Minister. 
The 1993 amendment also established 
a Land Tribunal as a court of equity 
to hear appeals arising from decisions 
made by land boards, and abolished 
the Minister’s role in dealing with 
appeals. A second Land Tribunal to 
serve the northern part of the country 
was established in 2005, based at 
Palapye. In 2006, the cabinet took an 
administrative decision that no further 
direct allocations of tribal land to non-
citizens would be permitted. Non-
citizens who want tribal land must now 
obtain it by sub-lease from citizens.
Some long-standing 
issues
Land boards are not entirely 
democratic or locally accountable 
institutions. The District Agricultural 
Wild Life and Commercial Administrative 
Officer is an ex officio member to 
represent agricultural interests, while 
the Game Warden (in some districts) 
is an ex officio member to represent 
the wildlife/conservation interest, and 
the remaining members are appointed 
by the Minister of Lands and Housing 
to represent local interests following 
‘elections’ in the kgotlas of each district 
as described above. The ‘elections’ 
are not held by secret ballot and only 
persons actually present at the kgotla 
may vote. Such persons are usually 
wealthier members of the community 
and large cattle owners. Most of the 
community is disenfranchised, as 
‘elections’ are only held in a few ‘main’ 
kgotlas, while opportunities for voter 
trafficking and vote buying are legion. 
As a result, the election results may not 
represent the wishes of the community 
as a whole. In any case, the results 
are not binding on the Minister, who 
appoints from a slate of twenty. As a 
result, appointments to the land board 
are widely viewed as a form of political 
patronage.
One consequence of the current 
procedure is that the Board Secretary 
tends to influence the Land Board 
Selection Committee to approve 
candidates who wish to stand 
for election and subsequently to 
recommend to the Minister candidates 
for appointment who will not give him 
problems or oppose his wishes. This is 
tantamount to ‘the mouse hiring the 
cat’ and results in the board members 
being effectively accountable to the 
Board Secretary, and not vice versa. At 
the same time, the board members are 
not accountable to the community they 
are supposed to serve. This is a recipe for 
trouble, particularly where the Board 
Secretary is corrupt or incompetent.
In view of the centralising nature of 
expanding bureaucracies, and the 
general improvement in forms of 
communication in Botswana since 
1970, it is perhaps inevitable that the 
Ministry of Lands and Housing has 
taken advantage of the opportunity to 
involve itself more closely in the affairs 
of the land boards (and other land 
matters at district level). As a result, all 
land boards receive a steady stream of 
instructions from officials in Gaborone 
who lack local knowledge or even the 
limited local accountability of the land 
board. 
At the same time, the land board’s own 
staff is appointed by the Ministry of 
Local Government Lands and Housing 
and is subject to the Ministry’s control. 
The land board is not permitted to give 
any instruction to the Board Secretary 
or any member of its staff. It may 
only pass resolutions and it is left to 
the Board Secretary to implement. 
As a result, the land board’s ability 
to act independently is somewhat 
curtailed. However, it should not be 
construed from the above that the land 
boards are ‘rubber stamps’ for central 
government.
The only qualification required for 
appointment to the land board 
is a Junior Certificate. There is no 
requirement for candidates to have any 
training or experience in land matters, 
although many do. Members’ pay is also 
poor: a member receives a daily sitting 
allowance of P162.75, or roughly P20.00 
per hour, and a monthly responsibility 
allowance of P5787.40 (US$713). This is 
roughly equivalent to the salary paid to 
a senior clerk in government. 
Problems encountered
There are a number of governance 
problems that result from the issues 
described above. The most important 
is lack of accountability, particularly 
local political accountability. The 
administrative structure of the land 
board system is centralised, but it lacks 
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effective controls, checks or balances 
from the centre on the activities of land 
boards on the ground. At the local level, 
local institutions such as the District 
Council or the Tribal Administration 
have little or no power to influence 
the conduct by the land boards of 
their business. This position has been 
exacerbated by the abolition in 1993 of 
the two representatives of the District 
Council and the chief’s representative.
Due to poor pay and the low level of 
qualification and experience required, 
some land boards have found difficulty 
in recruiting members of a high calibre 
who understand their role. Others, 
mostly those with lighter workloads 
in smaller districts, have succeeded 
in attracting sufficient candidates of 
high calibre who are willing to sacrifice 
income to give public service and 
thus raise the overall quality of board 
members to an adequate level.
The great majority of board members 
are dependent upon their income 
from the land board and all are aware 
of the Board Secretary’s power over 
their membership. As a result, they 
are rarely willing to challenge a Board 
Secretary’s actions and decisions, for 
fear that they may be removed from 
the board or not reappointed. This has 
led to a number of wrong decisions, 
dilutes accountability and encourages 
tolerance of incompetence and 
corruption.
Officials in the Ministry of Lands 
and Housing support this system, 
apparently because they think it gives 
them ‘control’ over the actions of 
land boards. The fallacy of this belief 
is well illustrated by the inability of 
that ministry to control events on 
tribal land in Mogoditshane, where 
widespread self-allocation and other 
illegal land activities are taking place. 
The unfortunate fact is that Board 
Secretaries are virtual ‘loose cannons’ 
who are not effectively monitored or 
held to account either by the Ministry 
or by their boards. The transfer of the 
District Officer (Lands) from the District 
Commissioner’s office to the land board 
has removed the only independent 
monitor within the government 
system.
Unfortunately, there has been a 
marked increase in corruption involving 
the administration and allocation 
of tribal land. Substantial tracts of 
communal land have been allocated 
as game farms and cattle ranches 
to both citizens and non-citizens in 
contravention of established procedure 
and, in some cases, of the Tribal Land 
Act itself. There have been numerous 
instances of the unlawful sale of tribal 
land, mostly in the peri-urban areas 
for residential, industrial or intensified 
agricultural use. False certificates to 
‘legitimise’ these parcels have been 
corruptly obtained from land boards 
or sub-land boards. Land over which 
rights are known to already exist has 
been allocated to others, often in 
return for a bribe. In some areas, land 
board staff have ‘allocated’ themselves 
parcels of land, issued themselves false 
‘certificates’ and then sold it on, often 
to non-citizens.
Despite an enormous investment 
in training, instances of sheer 
incompetence are also frequent. Double 
allocations, rejection of applications for 
insufficient reason and long delays in 
attending to applications and disputes 
are commonplace, and are frequently 
aired in public meetings and in the 
press.
Combined with the rising incidence 
of corruption, the frequency of 
incompetence and long administrative 
delays has led to a clear decline in public 
confidence in the system, and a marked 
increase in the number of cases referred 
to the Land Tribunals and other courts. 
Both Land Tribunals are inundated 
with cases and are unable to dispose 
of cases at a rate approaching that at 
which they are filed, so both have large 
backlogs of cases. There are numerous 
cases initiated as long as five years ago, 
which are far from resolution.
Conclusion
The basic principle of a decentralised 
and locally accountable system of 
administration of communally-owned 
land is a sound one and should be 
pursued in Botswana and elsewhere. 
Yet, there are a number of serious 
problems concerning the administration 
of tribal land, mainly due to poor 
governance and largely the result of ill-
advised changes to the Tribal Land Act 
and its regulations.
The basic problem is that the service 
providers themselves, to satisfy their 
own agenda rather than to meet the 
needs of service users, designed the 
system for administration of tribal 
land. This problem is not unique to 
land administration in Botswana, but 
needs to be addressed as a matter of 
urgency if national aspirations for 
economic growth and social justice are 
to be met. 
Furthermore, local conflicts continue 
between those who would like to 
decentralise power and those who 
are determined to retain control and 
power over resources. The system 
appears as if it has been designed to be 
dysfunctional, with an inappropriate 
distribution of power and responsibility, 
risk and reward between the various 
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actors and stakeholders. In particular, 
board members need to be allocated 
more power over their staff and the 
powers of the Board Secretary over the 
appointment and retention of board 
members should be curtailed.
Botswana’s experience of land boards 
is of interest to many countries in 
the region, yet additional work is 
still to be done to bring about more 
effective, democratic and participatory 
management of communal land rights 
and to devolve responsibility for land 
rights management to the rights 
holders. We need to learn from past 
mistakes and to reapply the founding 
principles upon which the system was 
designed. In particular, more emphasis 
on meeting the real needs of system 
users is required if the land rights 
of the poor are to be protected and 
upheld and national goals for social 
and economic development achieved.
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We are happy to announce the 
opening of a new space for 
democratic debate on policies and 
other key aspects of the politics and 
economics of land and agrarian 
change in Southern Africa.
The Institute for Poverty, Land 
and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) has 
launched its blog:
h t t p : / / a n o t h e r c o u n t r y s i d e .
wordpres s . com
We have created this space where 
we - and you - can speak and 
argue and debate about key issues 
relating to land and agrarian 
change in the subcontinent. Let us 
all imagine another countryside.
